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ABSTRACT 
Since the cessation of conflict in 2002, Sierra Leone has experienced extraordinary levels of involvement 
from Western donors. Paradoxically, while relationships are often portrayed on the ground as strong with 
significant donor influence, our research shows considerable fluidity in individual and institutional 
relationships. The article disaggregates donor-government relations at various levels over a short but 
crucial period, 2010-16, asking in each case who occupies the driving seat. In so doing, the article 
interrogates the concept of ‘extraversion’, investigating to what extent government - and indeed donors - 
has space in which to manoeuvre and how and why government and donors act as they do in this space. 
The period 2010-16 is of particular interest due to extreme iron ore price volatility and the Ebola 
epidemic of 2014–15. The article adds much-needed critique and empirical evidence to the debate on 
donor influence and ‘extraversion’. 
SETTING THE THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL SCENE 
This paper is concerned with Western donor-Government relations in Sierra Leone, which are 
longstanding, dating back in their current form to the end of the war in 2002 and even before that, 
extraordinarily intense, and complex. The relationships have been remarkably and consistently 
described by opposing actors on the ground as ‘strong’, ‘positive’, ‘permissive’, having 
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‘influence’ and playing a ‘big role’ (vis-à-vis donors) and being ‘open door’ and expressing 
‘appreciation’ (vis-à-vis  government) across a wide range of interlocutors (Donor, GoSL and 
NGO officials 2016 int.).1 These viewpoints are, however, starkly juxtaposed with fluctuating 
relationships across donors, ministries, personalities and indeed time, particularly within the 
period of this study. It is precisely this stark juxtaposition and the question of who is in the driving 
seat which are under critical investigation here. 
 
The paper is concerned with the relationships between a considerable range of Western donors and 
the many and varied players in the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) over time. Hence, it is 
better, although much more complex, to think of a constantly evolving topography of relationships 
rather than one that is static. The paper thus aims to disaggregate and map these relationships. 
However, it must also be noted that a disproportionate amount of the discussion, although not 
most of the interview material, emerges from the country’s largest bilateral donor – the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) – given its key role in the period addressed in 
the article and before. Other Western agencies are, however, compared in their relationship with 
GoSL and with each other. The article is not meant to measure the long-term efficacy of the 
projects, which is beyond its scope, but to document the processes. Such an approach is 
nonetheless important in that it helps us understand the complex nuances involved in government-
donor relations, and their implications for future engagement. 
 
During fieldwork in 2016 and using other interview material collected from 2010 onward, the 
authors capture a wide range of experiences and opinions from heads and senior staff of the main 
Western donor agencies, including DFID, EU and the World Bank, and consultants and advisors 
supporting donors; government representatives, senior officials and advisors from several 
departments including health, finance and justice; and heads and senior staff from international 
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and domestic NGOs involved in, or monitoring the transactions. During 2016, 25 people were 
interviewed, including four from domestic NGOs, six from international NGOs, five from GoSL, 
three advisors to GoSL, and seven from foreign governments and agencies. A total of 14 of the 25 
were Sierra Leonean, including three of the six from international NGOs and two of the three 
advisors. This group is supplemented by material from interviews of similar personnel in 2010, 
2011 and 2019. All interviewees were identified through contacts and snowballing and were most 
often heads of agencies or departments and so straddled policy areas. Note that all interviews were 
semi-structured and conducted anonymously in order to allow the expression of views. Identifiers 
in the article are equally anonymised: sometimes quite narrowly, e.g. GoSL department head; and 
sometimes quite broadly when assertions were made by several interlocutors, e.g. donor and GoSL 
officials. All interviews took place in Freetown.  
Looking at the period 2010-16 presents a tight chronological and political focus – the All People’s 
Congress (APC) led by President Ernest Koroma provided government during all of this short 
period – but at the same time neatly encompasses all of the key shifts related to the increase and 
collapse of iron ore production and prices, the Ebola crisis, and Post-Ebola Recovery, and indeed 
the Chinese presence, which have impinged on the relationships. It does not, however, preclude a 
historical understanding of the relationship, which is outlined below. The intensity of the 
processes during this period in Sierra Leone suggests that the conclusions are not immediately 
transferrable to other countries, except that many small African countries face highly fluctuating 
structural conditions and the article’s conclusions are most likely useful as a way of thinking 
through donor-government relations generally. 
The article rests on the question of whether there is space in which African actors can operate vis-
à-vis Western donors and vice versa, and what is done within that space and why. During the 
1970s, the idea of ‘dependency’ was developed in which African nations were seen as at the 
mercy of the international system. Seemingly little could be done by African governments in the 
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face of extreme imbalances in economic power from core to periphery, and in any case African 
leaders were merely a comprador bourgeoisie in league with outsiders (Bernstein 1973; Arrighi & 
Saul 1973). The two extreme oil price hikes of the 1970s fuelled the argument. Western nations 
were, further, deliberately ‘underdeveloping’ Africa (Rodney 1972). Although countries, such as 
South Korea, Singapore and Botswana, made the leap out of the periphery, the argument continues 
to raise its head concerning the many, such as Sierra Leone, which are left behind (Taylor 2016). 
Hence, within this argument, the structural imbalances of finance, capacity and power give today’s 
Western actors - and in this case donors - a serious upper hand and severely restrict African room 
to manoeuvre.  
However, it has been suggested that the difference in the ‘miraculous’ developmental experience 
of East Asia and that of much of Africa is better explained by more successful government state-
led policies rather than any structural conditions (Chang 2006). Equally, but with far less 
economic progress, the notion of extraversion questions the one-sidedness of structural conditions 
and the limited agency and autonomy assigned to the periphery. It stresses the usage of 
dependency: ‘the creation and the capture of a rent generated by dependency’ (Bayart 2000: 222). 
Within ideas of extraversion, Africans have leverage and strategies of handling outsiders from 
around the world and one can see historical and contemporary expertise (Bayart 2000; Cooper 
2002; Clapham 2006; Taylor 2009). The Cold War era showed non-aligned African governments 
adept at playing off East and West to the material benefit of their regimes. The post-Cold War era 
of aid, conditionalities on aid and economic and political liberalisation has had its casualties in 
African politics but many leaders and governments learned quickly to ‘adjust to adjustment’, 
utilise the bargaining power present in the international need for success stories, and reap the 
benefits of apparent or partial compliance with aid imperatives (Chabal & Daloz 1999: 122).  
The notion has, however, been criticised for downplaying the ‘historicity of the specific insertion 
of Africa in the world’ (Ricard 2017: 506) and a lack of regard for its potentially destructive 
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relationships (Lindsay 2014). It has also been accused of being ‘sweeping’ in nature and thus 
lacking empirical depth and attention to perturbations over time (Peiffer & Englebert 2012: 361), 
gaps that this article will contribute to filling. By investigating government-donor relationships in 
Sierra Leone, both the plausibility and purposes of African agency and the structural and 
conceptual limits of extraversion can be interrogated. In other words, how much space do GoSL 
and donors have, what do they do with it, to what extent can extraversion strategies work within 
(fluctuating) structural confines, and does extraversion explain all that is done within the carved-
out space? 
Some have indeed noted that there is space, albeit circumscribed, for African actors. On the 
government side, similar to the above, there is the cynical but rather effective approach employed 
by African governments to attract Western aid in exchange for limited and unsustainable levels of 
reforms (Abouassi, 2010. Muhumuza 2008; Treisman 2007), and alternatively, there may be 
active or passive resistance for political and/or cultural reasons (Young 2002; Brown 2013; 
Richmond 2010; Fanthorpe 2006). On the ground, however, it is not that simple. Most officials, 
wherever they are in government, face multiple and shifting stresses and incentives. In Sierra 
Leone, a small state where donors have indeed had more sway, there are pressures to follow many 
donor lines, contrary pressures to be seen to be resistant to other donor lines, and obligations - in 
what is still to a significant degree a patron-cliental system - to patrons above and to ethno-
regional support bases, family, kith and kin below (Conteh 2016). Presidential, ministerial and 
lower echelon actions at any one time reflect a calculation concerning these shifting imperatives 
and thus explain to a considerable degree the level of success or failure of any given reform and 
the overall limited returns of aid programmes (Harris 2013: 153-7; Tavakoli et al 2014: 6-7).  
Political negotiations over aid have been usefully delineated into what is decided by government, 
what is a compromise and what is reluctantly accepted (Whitfield 2009). Western donors thus 
have considerable sway but there is also a finite space in which they can operate. On the donor 
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side, the immense effort which has been expended in refining and re-refining the modus operandi 
and conditionalities of aid shows a strong commitment to an ideological impetus. The continued 
alignment with liberalism as the underpinning driver of development, despite limited historical or 
contemporary evidence, is remarkable in its zeal (Young 2002; Paris 2010, Gallagher 2011).2 
There are mitigating factors such as institutional and personal career interests and there are those 
who instead see national interests at work (Rimmer 2003; Easterly 2006). For instance, the UK is 
one of the few major countries to spend 0.7% of its GDP on aid but in 2016, Minister for 
International Development, Priti Patel, championed using aid to pave the way for trade deals (BBC 
2016); and in 2018 Prime Minister Theresa May said she was "unashamed” about ensuring Britain 
also benefits from its aid spending (BBC 2018). However, despite a ‘crisis in confidence’, Western 
efforts are remarkably resilient and strikingly still thoroughly connected to liberal reform (Cooper 
2007). Notably, though, the space to implement any of these measures has limits and donors are 
also forced to make their compromises and reluctant acceptances; again territory that this article 
will investigate. 
Finally, while there are indeed many in government who can be seen to pay lip-service to liberal 
reform in an arena where choice is restricted but there are equally some who are ideologically 
committed, which is firmly outside of the realm of extraversion. Many African ministries and 
departments are undergoing reform pushed by very small numbers of committed indigenes, 
sometimes rather jarringly referred to as ‘technocrats’ (Harris 2013: 154-5). There are also a few 
African governments, such as in Ethiopia and Rwanda (Furtado & Smith 2009; Hayman 2009), 
which have taken an ideological stance against certain liberal reforms and there are a small 
number of actors in Sierra Leone who take similar views and suggest alternative policy.  
The article breaks down the relationships in Sierra Leone and puts empirical flesh on the bones of 
the extraversion debate. It investigates reasons for African actions and tests the salience and the 
limits of the concept of extraversion in explaining Sierra Leonean imperatives in the face of donor 
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requirements. It considers the ideas of passive and active resistance, notions of political survival 
and cultural protection, and degrees of control in the relationship on the Sierra Leone government 
side, while also investigating imperatives, negotiation stances and degrees of control on the donor 
side. It investigates the notion that there are ‘red lines’ that each side say they will not cross and to 
what extent they are successful. In addition, it also disaggregates, at institutional and personal 
levels, not just government-donor relations but also intra-government and donor-donor relations in 
the Sierra Leonean context. Importantly, it adds the possibility in some policy areas of the 
convergence of government and donor thinking. Finally, it looks at how the space opens and 
closes over time and through changing conditions.  
Hence, in what is seen as one of the more stable, cooperative and positive donor-government 
relationships in Africa, even the Sierra Leonean environment has many potentially unstable facets 
on both sides of the fence. Close relations with the UK date back to a relatively smooth 
decolonisation in 1961. Contacts drew down somewhat during the 1970s and 1980s under 
President Siaka Stevens, but were significantly reinvigorated from the start of the Tony Blair UK 
government in 1997 (Kargbo 2006). In the midst of the civil war, the UK diplomatically, 
financially and finally, in 2000, militarily backed the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) 
government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. It is less of a surprise then that the 10-year assistance deal 
was signed at the end of the war in 2002, that the UK to a greater extent ran the immediate post-
war government, and that UK assistance continues until today and indeed spearheaded the fight 
against Ebola and the Post-Ebola Recovery. UK national interests in this process include the pre-
empting and preventing of future crises for which its assistance would be needed. One might also 
consider the UK punching above its weight in the global arena leading to key roles in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, but from the ‘ethical foreign policy’ of the UK Foreign Minister at the time, Robin Cook, 
through to Blair’s liberal zeal, one can see the ideological fingerprints. 
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However, despite the intensity of the relationship, it was not all plain sailing from the end of the 
civil war in 2002 up to the start of this study in 2010. While decentralisation and a large free 
healthcare initiative were both presidentially backed and rolled out on time, in 2004 and 2010 
respectively, studies show these expensive projects have considerable flaws (Conteh 2016). In 
2007, DFID went so far as to suspend budget support stating that this was a benchmarks-informed 
decision. The year 2007 was, however, also an election year in which the 11-year incumbency of 
the SLPP was ended by the APC. The accusation by the SLPP of attempted regime change by 
suspending funds just before elections was to live with DFID for years to come (Cargill 2008: 3; 
Donor and GoSL officials 7.2010 int.).  
One might note that the Sierra Leonean governments of this period relied heavily on outsiders for 
support during the war and in post-conflict rebuilding in the immediate post-war period, and donor 
influence was thus high with many liberal reforms being outsider inspired, driven and funded 
(Kanyako 2016). Many, however, did not gain much traction and the reforms that were best 
delivered, whatever their ideological compatibility, were those that fitted squarely with 
government imperatives of the time. This may be termed extraversion, although the 2007 
temporary withdrawal of funds can be seen as an example of heavier exertion of donor influence. 
However, with the insertion of the considerable stresses that iron ore price fluctuations and Ebola 
add to the equation, the stability in the many relationships is put further into question. Diamonds 
have long been the mainstay of the extraction economy in Sierra Leone but it was iron ore that 
caused excitement in the early 2010s. Buoyed by needs in Asia, prices rose dramatically and in 
2011 iron ore extraction began in Tonkolili and recommenced after a 35-year hiatus at Marampa. 
Estimates emerged of revenue in the billions of dollars and double digit GDP growth for years to 
come. In November 2011, Finance Minister Samura Kamara and the IMF predicted 50% GDP 
growth just for 2012 (Thomas n.d.; IMF 2011). Indeed, by early 2014, Sierra Leone was already 
the sixth-largest exporter of iron ore to China. However, a little over a year later both mines had 
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ceased production and both companies had gone into administration, mostly a consequence of the 
precipitous drop in iron ore prices and the onset of Ebola (Metal Bulletin 2015), a situation that 
has remained largely unchanged, as illustrated in the table below.  
Table 1  
 
In turn, the Ebola disease emerged in Guinea in December 2013, but hit crisis proportions in 
Sierra Leone in mid-2014. Both the domestic and international response to Ebola were highly 
criticised and, by the time the last case was recorded in January 2016, over 14,000 people had 
contracted the disease and nearly 4,000 had died; schools, farms and businesses had been closed 
or under-used for long periods; and the economy was reeling (Davis 2015). The international 
response was indeed late but large and continued into the Post-Ebola Recovery period. 
There is in addition one further factor to consider, that of China. Chinese investment, trade and 
‘gifts’ in Sierra Leone have been described as ‘unquestionably of extreme importance’ and 
primarily encompass infrastructure projects, such as a new foreign ministry building, roads 
particularly in the capital, and a stadium in Bo, and mining ventures. (Datzberger 2013: 1) A 
planned airport at Mamamah was also Chinese-backed but proved highly controversial, was 
resisted by Western donors (ibid; senior diplomat, international NGO senior staff, and domestic 
advisor to GoSL 22, 20 & 25.7.2016 int.), and was eventually scrapped when APC lost power. 
However, China is a relatively constant element during the 2010-16 period and so appears below 
only as a contributory factor. 
DONOR INFLUENCE IN SIERRA LEONE 
The role of donors in Sierra Leone’s post-war recovery and development has been remarkable. In 
fact, by the time the war ended in 2002 donors and Western international agencies ‘ended up 
literally taking over the governance function from local actors’ (Fukuyama, 2004:125). It has been 
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estimated that the United Nations spent US$16.4 billion a year in the immediate aftermath of the 
conflict, while DFID spent ‘about £100 million per year for Sierra Leone’s reconstruction process’ 
(Kanyako 2016:27; Baker & May 2006). Although donors have adopted multiple mechanisms for 
delivering aid, the main vehicle through which they have done so is Direct Budget Support (DBS). 
A recent evaluation of DBS noted that between 2002 and 2014, Sierra Leone received ‘a total of 
US$886 million in direct budget support, equivalent to an average of US$68 million per year’ for 
a population of 5-6 million (Ecorys, 2016: 16). The figures break down as follows: 
Table 2  
 
Further, notwithstanding a few detractors, it is also remarkable how the donor-government 
relationship in Sierra Leone was so consistently painted on the ground. None at all suggested 
anything other than high donor influence on government, particularly with respect to the UK. 
Within the timeframe of the research, the UK was portrayed as having ‘unparalleled access’ and 
the relationship as ‘hugely permissive’ (International advisor to GoSL and senior diplomat 11 & 
22.7.2016 int.). UK influence was seen as ‘strong’ particularly during the Ebola and Post-Ebola 
period and the concurrent tenure of UK High Commissioner, Peter West (2013-16), and the UK 
always stood ‘a good chance of prevailing on issues’. GoSL was thought to have a particularly 
‘positive’ and ‘appreciative’ view of the UK and saw the UK as the ‘preferred option’ (Senior 
diplomat and international agency head 22 & 24.11.2016 int.). Finally it was considered that 
connections were not just based on money, but were built on good individual relationships and 
were even ‘cultural’ in nature or encompassing ‘deference to the British’ (Senior diplomat and 
international advisor to GoSL 22 & 11.7.2016 int.). The latter comment is a notion that has long 
troubled scholars of Sierra Leone and is discussed further below. 
It was commented by many though that donor access to government was certainly not restricted to 
the UK and was, rightly or wrongly, very high across the board. It was suggested by one donor 
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that access was ‘perhaps too easy’ and by a critical government official that it was ‘open door’ and 
‘unlimited’ (International agency head and GoSL department head 15 & 19.7.2016 int.). Most 
access to government was said to be on a personal basis, often with the President or his Chief of 
Staff or sometimes ministers, and as long as there were personal connections access could be 
arranged at any time (Donor, government and NGO officials 7 & 11.2016 int.). Official donor-
GoSL meetings were described as not working well or not happening mainly because the key links 
were personal, and because the traditional government interlocutor and one of the few centres of 
resistance, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), was seen by some 
donors as disruptive and thus side-lined (International agency head and GoSL department head 15 
& 19.7.2016 int.). One international agency head noted that one can walk into ministers’ offices 
and, because of the absence of landlines, one calls a minister direct, not the secretary, and so there 
is no vetting of calls (26.7.2016 int.). Sierra Leone does, however, have a long pre-mobile phone 
history of personalised politics, with the early part of the Stevens presidency providing the first 
model of the accessible patron. Concern was thus noted that many, if not all, contemporary donor 
agencies simply fitted themselves neatly into the pattern (International agency head 26.7.2016 
int.). However, this scenario is also not new: in 2010, it was described as ‘lighthouse politics’, 
where Koroma was considered to be the ‘lighthouse’ who could shine his political light on a 
policy and drive it through. Donors’ work was to regulate the light as it moved on from one point 
to the next (International NGO head 16.7.2010 int.). 
Hence, from the donor angle, business can be pushed forward. Indeed, reform measures were 
sometimes said to be pushed through this strategy even in unpromising avenues. Since 2010, the 
agricultural smallholder commercialisation programme and the establishment of an independent 
medical procurement unit were said to be derived almost entirely from donors, even if backed by 
the President. One area where donors were said to have had enormous influence was in public 
financial management (PFM) reforms. As one GoSL official noted, ‘all the laws enacted since 
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2009 that have to do with the management of the economy have the fingerprints of the donors’ 
(GoSL department senior official 2.7.2019). From within and either side of the study period, some 
of the notable results of donor pressure for PFM reforms include the Mines and Minerals Act 
2009; Goods and Services Tax Act, 2009; Customs Act, 2011; Government Budgeting and 
Accountability (Amendment) Act, 2011; Public Debt Management Act, 2011; 
Telecommunications (Amendment) Act, 2015; Public Financial Management Act, 2016; and 
Fiscal Management and Control Act, 2017. However, despite these reforms, they did not 
necessarily alter the status quo, and in some instances, GoSL was engaged in a game of mock 
compliance. For example, even though the latter act came into force in 2017, it was not 
implemented until in 2018, when an executive order by the new SLPP government established the 
single treasury account, which officials in the APC government had resisted (Ibid.).  
Within this study’s timescale, donor influence was said to have pushed the (partial) access of 
pregnant schoolgirls to schooling, the dismantling of the board of the medical procurement unit, 
the dismissal of the Director of Traffic after a report into police bribery, and payroll cleaning in 
the Ministry of Education (MoE) (Two international agency heads, senior diplomat, and GoSL 
department head 7 & 11.2016 int.; Citizen’s Agenda for Prosperity Coalition). All were seen as 
going against policies, values or vested interests held by some in the departments and ministries. 
More detail appears below.  
In particular, the fight against Ebola and the establishment of the Post-Ebola Recovery Programme 
made some of the relationships more intense, even if sometimes contentious. The British military 
worked closely with its Sierra Leonean counterpart – but not with the police as it was believed 
only the army had sufficient capacity – and DFID played a leading role in the international effort. 
Many interlocutors noted that DFID went on to play the lead role in the two-year Post-Ebola 
Recovery period (June 2015 to June 2017), particularly by supporting the establishment and 
operations of the Delivery Team in the heart of the Executive in State House, a process that did 
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not however secure the support of some other Western donors. These contestations are also 
elaborated below.  
Indeed, some saw what might be called dependency or deference. Uncomfortable for some, a 
Sierra Leonean narrative of a ‘big brother’ (in the fraternal, not the Orwellian, sense) or ‘parent-
child’ relationship was depicted at various points (International agency head and international 
advisor to GoSL 11.7 & 24.11.2016 int.). A common phrase heard during the Ebola crisis was 
‘Papa don cam fo save pikin’, meaning ‘Father has returned to save his children’ and mostly in 
reference to the British intervention. One international agency head raised the over-reliance on the 
international organisations to bail out government and illustrated by noting the dismal state of 
ministries and how a minister wrote to him asking for a ‘pittance’ for fixing a piece of ministerial 
infrastructure as the MoFED had no money (26.7.2016 int.). 
EXTRAVERSION IN SIERRA LEONE 
Among government officials, there were varying interpretations of how the relationship with 
donors was unfolding, and the imperatives driving the government’s actions. One position was 
that the government was left with a restricted choice or without the political will to resist donor 
policies: ‘If you have been without food for a week and you are given wheat to eat and you are 
gluten intolerant, it is still your ‘choice’ whether to eat’ (Domestic advisor to GoSL 25.7.2016 
int.). Several inside and outside government derided the lack of GoSL ownership of policy. 
Others, however, saw a short-term instrumental or political imperative – extraversion - in allowing 
such access across the board (Donor and government officials 7.2016). The second phase of the 
Post-Ebola Recovery came under the title of the ‘President’s Recovery Priorities’ and billboards 
and government vehicles sported the President’s Recovery logo on them. Although Koroma 
constitutionally stepped down at the 2018 elections – not long after the end of the Post-Ebola 
Recovery – suspicion abounded that he wanted to use the programme to make a case for an 
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elongation of his tenure, or at least boost his legacy and  his party’s electoral chances (Donor and 
GoSL officials 7.2016 int.). Indeed, by keeping the donors close, his hands could be kept 
somewhere close to the tiller.  
One diplomat noted the unrealistic short-term expectations of one minister alongside thinly-veiled 
threats that children might die and the news might reach the (British tabloid) Daily Mail 
(22.7.2016 int.). An international advisor to GoSL explained that government officials are better at 
sourcing money from various donors than donors are at coordinating and knowing what was going 
on (11.7.2016 int.). As already noted, there are also cases of mock compliance, such as the hurried 
passage of the Access to Information Law in October 2013 – which had been in the making for 
almost a decade – in an apparent bid to influence the decision of the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation in that year (Domestic NGO head 12.7.2016 int.); and the politically instrumental 
purposes served by the donor supported decentralization programme (Conteh 2017). Agency in 
government needs emphasis, as the availability of donor funds fosters a sense of moral hazard and 
allows the government to channel resources to other uses such as infrastructural projects and 
public and political goods, and from which officials can obtain personalised transactional gains 
(Conteh 2016).  
In a clear case of the restrictions on donor engagements, a Sierra Leonean NGO head noted that it 
was risky for donors to say certain things because there may be accusations of meddling and 
because donor staff need to keep their jobs, so donors are ‘conflict averse’. The public silence of 
donors, after Vice President Samuel Sam-Sumana was controversially removed in 2015 and on the 
mooted elongation of President Koroma’s tenure were noted as examples of this reticence 
(18.7.2016 int.). 
IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN SIERRA LEONE 
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However, there were Sierra Leoneans in GoSL and domestic and international organisations who 
were at least somewhat aligned with the liberal international agenda and so would be in favour of 
close relations - even though such ties can be threatened by non-ideological agendas. Policy 
alternatives were occasionally raised in interviews, infrastructure being a key issue. The 
disagreements of various hues are detailed in the next section. Several interviews were held with 
high-ranking Sierra Leonean staff of donor agencies who mostly aligned with donor agendas. 
Many donors detailed policies taken to and wholeheartedly supported by the President (7.2016 
int.). The major introduction in 2015 of Service Level Agreements (SLA) between the Ministry of 
Health and Sanitation (MoHS) and mostly donor-funded NGO service providers in order to 
monitor and provide accountability for all programmes was broadly accepted by all concerned, 
even if there were contestations over its financing and sustainability (GoSL department head and 
international NGO head 25 & 22.7.2016 int.). Tellingly, a Sierra Leonean NGO head went so far 
as to say that donors should push more in demanding reform (18.7.2016 int.).  
The donors clearly enjoy influence to push forward reform agendas, although often by 
compromising and playing within the largely personalised format of Sierra Leonean government. 
GoSL then often accepts or indeed embraces many donor imperatives either through lack of 
choice, for politically instrumental purposes, or due to ideological alignment. There are, however, 
significant perturbations in this environment and the following section looks at particular issues, 
seemingly with GoSL or donor red lines, which illuminate the terrain.  
GOVERNMENT AND DONOR ‘RED LINES’ 
One Sierra Leonean NGO head noted that, ‘donors have influence, but it’s not as heavy as we 
think. There is negotiation’ (19.7.2016 int.). Indeed, there certainly was. As well as the above 
mentioned areas where donors secured agreement and indeed where they managed to push or 
partially push through policies in the teeth of resistance from within government, there were also 
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areas where they were not able to do similar and a few areas where government pushed policies. 
Exactly which areas were guarded by government ‘red lines’, and by whom is instructive. Equally, 
there are policies agreed and then shunted into the long grass. Finally, there are ‘red lines’ to 
which the donors claimed to adhere. 
Encounters with government ‘red lines’ emerge along three broad interlinking axes: 
democratically problematic policies, socially problematic policies, and intra-governmentally 
problematic policies. In turn, the robustness of the red lines was sometimes linked to the quantity 
and GoSL proportion of revenue, e.g. payroll, but sometimes not, e.g. social issues. The policies 
which are liable to have direct and immediate effects on the populace come under the first banner 
of democratically problematic, and which coincidentally reflect donor demands for PFM reforms 
in order for GoSL to increase its revenue. Although, as noted above, popular democratic politics is 
informed by a high level of ethno-regional patron-clientelism, there are some key areas of policy 
where shifts in voter thinking are possible and hence problematic for the ruling party, regardless of 
GoSL’s long-term financial position. For instance, IMF insistence on the removal of fuel subsidy 
to save money and stop smuggling was agreed by one part of GoSL but then refused by another: 
one international agency head described this as ‘a merry dance’ (15.7.2016 int.).  Perhaps this was 
less of a ‘red line’: under severe fiscal pressure in November 2016 GoSL finally enacted a partial 
removal. Privatisation of water, electricity and telecommunications bodies were resisted on the 
basis that prices would rise for customers and Government Sales Tax on electricity was opposed 
for the same reasons (International agency head 20.7.2016 int.). Some considered that as elections 
approach, donor traction usually deteriorates: for the 2012 elections it was thought 18 months in 
advance, and for the March 2018 elections the effect was believed to be inevitable but probably 
later as the Post-Ebola Recovery period was scheduled to continue until June 2017 (Donor 
officials 7.2010 & 7.2016 int.). 
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The social aspect links with the democratic, but the two main social ‘red lines’ raised in interviews 
may be treated separately here as there are also societal mores involved. The first relates to a 
popular subject amongst donors, that of pregnant girls and access to education. Described as a 
‘moral issue’, many including three ministers – one of whom was portrayed as ‘very stubborn’ - 
were noted as being firmly against allowing access to classes and school exams for the girls 
(International NGO head 22.7.2016 int.). The President was noted by donors as being helpful and 
a compromise was reached so that the girls could access the core curriculum but separate from 
their classmates and still with no exams. Even this compromise would seemingly have gone 
nowhere without the President (International agency head and senior diplomat 15 & 22.7.2016 
int.; Amnesty International 2016). On Female Genital Mutilation/Circumcision there was no 
movement at all despite it being a donor concern for a long time, stretching back to the colonial 
era. Described by one Sierra Leonean NGO head as an issue seen by many as ‘our culture’, 
another Sierra Leonean head of an international NGO had been asked to go ‘softly-softly’ on this 
issue by a ministry sympathiser so as not to risk any small steps to progress (18 & 22.7.2016). The 
President had said some encouraging words but one international agency head thought that 
actually paying the political cost was much less likely (24.11.2016 int.).  
Finally, reasons for intra-governmental resistance beyond the social issues above may be 
segregated into three interlocking parts: power, corruption and policy. Considerable anxiety was 
expressed over perceived winners and losers in the government. The processes of donor access to 
government and of policy-making were seen by many as having shifted from the ministries and 
departments to State House and the President. This was particularly so concerning the post-Ebola 
Delivery Team, an aspect which is detailed below. Considering that Sierra Leone had long been an 
executive-heavy government, this more recent shift represented a further degree of centralisation. 
In addition, a considerable proportion of money and responsibility that once went via the 
ministries now went via the donors’ NGO implementing partners, which in turn may have been 
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opposition supporters, or well-paid international consultants. Hence disgruntlement and spoilers in 
the system were generated. Several interlocutors noted that the President had needed to bring 
complaining ministers back in line (Donor and GoSL officials 7 & 11.2016 int.). 
Vested interests and corruption were another stumbling block to policy. Control of procurement 
was a common theme. Payroll cleaning at the MoE was considered a problem in 2010 and, 
although some reforms had been made, it remained a problem in 2016 (Donor officials 7.2010, 
7.2011 & 7.2016 int.). During negotiations leading to the setting up of the Delivery Team, an 
attempt by DFID to make payroll cleaning in the MoE and MoHS a condition for the post-Ebola 
Recovery financial aid was resisted by GoSL (Delivery Team official 19.7.2016 int). In a striking 
case of realpolitik, one international advisor to GoSL stated that ‘if you bang the table too hard, 
you don’t get asked to meetings’ and it is useless shouting from the side-lines, so some level of 
corruption is ‘tolerated’ in order to maintain access (17.7.2016 int.). Even during the Ebola crisis, 
party politics down to the local level was reported to sometimes severely affect implementation. 
Corruption emerged in the form of low-level examples, such as ‘ghost worker’ claims for hazard 
pay and bribes for vehicle passes to enter or leave quarantine zones, through to the two national 
audit reports which found widespread inadequate control mechanisms and accounting of response 
funds (Ross et al 2017: 36). Similarly, advice by the World Bank to end the virtual rice monopoly 
by one favoured Lebanese importer at 0% tax was not heeded (International agency head 
20.7.2016 int.). 
GoSL also sometimes had its own policies to push which did or did not align with the donors’ 
agendas. Infrastructure, for example energy and roads, has always been a key government, but less 
often a donor, priority (Domestic advisor to GoSL 25.7.2016 int.). Chinese funding has sometimes 
proved useful here. Despite the IMF taking a strong stance against construction of a new airport, 
the President maintained his commitment and billboards remained in place. In addition, although 
GoSL had signed up to a US$31 million World Bank loan to land the fibre optic cable in 2011 
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(Web Africa 2016), it resisted pressure to liberalise the international gateway, which was one of 
the loan conditions. Keen to preserve the monopoly of the state-owned telecom operator 
(SIERRATEL) over the gateway, the government persistently failed to meet its obligations, which 
forced the World Bank to warn in March 2014 that it would suspend the project (Global Times 
2014). Despite the eventual suspension in September 2014, it was not until March 2015 that the 
government agreed to amend the Telecommunications Act to liberalise the gateway 
(TeleGeography 2015). 
During fieldwork, two new government-generated policies were also in the spotlight. The SLAs 
appeared to have gained traction across the board. A proposed 5% levy on donor-supported health 
programmes ostensibly to support the MoHS and Local Councils in joint monitoring processes, 
however, was resisted by donors partly because this could then be rolled out across all ministries 
funded by them (International NGO head and GoSL department head 22 & 25.7.2016 int.). Both 
of these policies, however, could be described as procedural in support of, or indeed endeavouring 
to take control of, donor agendas (GoSL department head and international agency head 25 & 
26.7.2016 int.).  
One might note a complex and shifting pattern of government ‘red lines’, but as can also be seen 
from the above, donor ‘red lines’ can or have to be quite flexible as well. There is general strong 
impetus for liberal reform but some emphasised projects have historically taken off – 
decentralisation and the free health care initiative - and others have not – reforms in several 
ministries and departments including health, education and the National Revenue Authority 
(NRA) - leading perhaps to a phlegmatic attitude. During the period of interviewing in 2016, the 
areas of fisheries and justice reform were specifically noted by donors as areas of limited traction 
(International agency heads 18.7.2016 & 24.11.2016 int.). The notion of ‘good enough 
governance’ began to gain currency in donor circles in the 2010s and it is perhaps with this idea 
that an explanation can be sought. Equally, it might be said that in Sierra Leone a policy-maker 
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that had the President’s ear was the one with the policy that was most likely to fly. If they did not, 
the chances of flight were rather slimmer. 
Hence, GoSL officials may promote, acquiesce to, or successfully resist, divert or force 
compromise on donor reforms, in particular those that affect their own democratic, social or 
internal governmental imperatives, thereby manipulating the agenda. Extraversion can be seen in 
some of this manipulation, but it is much less compelling when resistance or actions along lines of 
societal mores or government-led policy are included. In turn, donors maintain considerable 
influence but are forced into their own compromises and may indeed back off from certain key 
policies. Changing conditions then play a part in these fluid relationships.  
CHANGES OVER TIME IN DONOR-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIPS 
There do indeed appear to be changes over time in donor-government relations. These have been 
attributed to iron ore, Ebola and China, but also to changes which have occurred because of 
deliberate shifts in practice by key players either partly or wholly informed by these external 
factors. The changes might generally be apportioned under economic shifts, i.e. commodity prices, 
and humanitarian crises, i.e. Ebola; but also with influence from changes in global politics, i.e. 
China and shifts in Western donor policies, and events in domestic politics, i.e. elections. Views 
are necessarily restricted to interlocutors who had experience over a considerable proportion of the 
six years of the study.  
One Sierra Leonean NGO head expressed the view that in the longue durée little in the 
relationships changed as iron ore revenues did not persist long enough to make a difference. A 
GoSL domestic advisor noted that GoSL confidence backed by iron ore lasted about one year (18 
& 25.7.2016 int.). However, this brief confidence did not go unnoticed. One international agency 
senior official reported that when iron ore was coming online, a minister told donors that in two 
years’ time, he would no longer be talking to them. If iron ore had come on stream as predicted, 
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the same interviewee thought that donors would have been ‘going home’. GoSL was ‘tough’ with 
donors for a short period of time (20.7.2016 int.).3 A domestic advisor for the government side 
attributed to iron ore confidence the promulgation of a new shipping law – unpopular with donors 
– and the ousting of the UN head, Michael von der Schulenburg, in 2012 (25.7.2016 int.). 
Unbudgeted spending increased – albeit that this was also election time - and ambitious road and 
energy projects were started, partly financed through loans leading to an increase of 33% in 
external debt between 2011 and 2013. The government secured the US$315 million loan for the 
new airport in this period (Mihalyi 2015). As noted above, the Chinese were also seen as a source 
for the strengthening position, probably though only as a contributory factor to the iron ore. 
However, if iron ore brought about a brief swell of confidence in GoSL, largely unprecedented in 
the post-war era, the drop in iron ore prices and Ebola restored the status quo or even shifted the 
influence balance back to the dire conditions of the immediate post-war period. Initial reactions to 
Ebola by both government and international bodies were characterised by ‘confusion, chaos and 
denial’ (Ross et al 2017: 2). However, once the Ebola outbreak had been fully recognised as a 
humanitarian crisis, international assistance came very quickly and in early September 2014, the 
UK took over the lead international role. In turn, the National Ebola Response Centre (NERC) 
was opened in mid-October. It was the UK, UN and US which comprised the international 
element of the NERC and on the Sierra Leonean side the lead role was taken away from the 
MoHS, causing some friction, and handed to the seconded Minister of Defence who directly 
briefed the president (Ross et al 2017). The British Army and DFID played major roles in 
organisation and implementation (International advisor to GoSL and senior diplomat 11 & 
17.7.2016 int.). 
Importantly for the discussion here, one can begin to see the seeds of shifts in donor-government 
practices. Some saw the UK literally taking over. In a state of crisis this may be understandable, 
but some viewed the UK as running the show and even for a time in the early stages ‘operating in 
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parallel to the NERC’ (Ross et al 2017: 29). However, the President was also seen as having a 
detailed handle on the response and, probably more accurately, policy decisions were made by the 
President and the British in tandem, sometimes with UN input. Indeed, the idea of quarantines was 
pushed by the President against advice from the UK (ibid). Importantly, this was the beginnings of 
a much closer presidential-UK association, relatively insulated from other international and 
governmental parties.  
In some ways, donor-government relations in the post-Ebola recovery period reflected those of the 
Ebola crisis and response, with the UK re-emerging as the most dominant external actor. In an 
agreement between President Koroma and the UK International Development Minister, Justine 
Greening, the DFID plan was accepted over others. The central idea was to learn from the Ebola 
response: to focus narrowly on what was required for recovery in a two-year period (International 
agency heads 26.7.2016 & 24.11.2016 int.). One key plank of the DFID strategy, and most likely 
another lesson from the Ebola response and in particular from the NERC, was the creation of the 
Delivery Team in State House. The Delivery Team was essentially two parallel groups, one 
governmental and one advisory, the latter expensively assembled and comprising about 25 
members of two consultancy firms employed by DFID - McKinsey and Adam Smith International 
- and the then Africa Governance Initiative (AGI), an NGO established in 2008 by Tony Blair. 
Most importantly, due to its geographical location and the role of DFID and the President in 
setting up the team, the close association between these two actors was maintained.  
From one angle, the donor rationale was explained as the need to strike while the iron is hot and to 
use the period of Post-Ebola Recovery to push through as much as possible, before the onset of 
campaigning for the 2018 elections and potentially before GoSL turned to the Chinese (Diplomat 
and international agency head 22.7.2016 & 24.11.2016 int.). However, from other angles, the tone 
changed. DFID, particularly in 2015, was variously seen as ‘arrogant’, ‘bullying’, ‘resented’ and 
not a ‘team-player’, and as having ‘solved’ the Ebola crisis and so legitimated to take a similar 
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approach into the future. The Delivery Team was labelled by government and donor officials as 
‘DFID’s Delivery Team’ (Donor and GoSL officials 7.2016 int.). It was noted by some that donor-
donor relations had since improved, that DFID was more open to coordination by mid-2016, and 
that it was the DFID staff who had worked on the Ebola response that had been more insular 
(Donor and NGO officials 7.2016 int.). However, the modus operandus of the Post-Ebola 
Recovery was established as one where DFID worked closely with the Delivery Team and hence 
the President, and implementation passed through NGOs, thereby further bypassing the ministries 
and local councils. Other donors ignored or worked when necessary with the Post-Ebola Recovery 
programme.  
The disagreements did not however stop there. In policy terms, there were differences in substance 
and modes of delivery. One international NGO head argued that the Post-Ebola Recovery 
priorities were not actually focused but too broad in that there were, by then, 45 initiatives and 
over 150 sub-initiatives, the latter including such large projects as community health workers. It 
had been seen in the past that placing such heavy and wide responsibilities on a small number of 
people can lead to burn out and this was also raised by the same interlocutor as an issue for the 
Delivery Team (16.7.2016 int.). While DFID focused heavily on the Post-Ebola Recovery 
priorities, the EU was noted as being long-term and ‘rigid’ or ‘unchangeable’ in its programming 
and disconnected from GoSL on a day-to-day basis, so not buying into the DFID strategy (Donor 
and NGO officials 7.2016 int.). Equally, to a greater extent the World Bank continued to work 
through the ministries, and not directly with the Delivery Team; and while DFID shifted to 
working almost exclusively through NGO implementing partners, UNICEF shifted the other way 
(International agency senior official and international NGO head 20 & 22.7.2016 int.). 
External and largely uncontrollable conditions in the form of commodity prices and a 
humanitarian crisis appear, then, to heavily affect the operations of donor influence and 
extraversion. The presence of China and the domestic electoral cycle added further perturbations. 
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GoSL confidence vis-à-vis donors appeared to wax and wane in almost direct proportion to 
conditions, although noteworthy is the brief period of government confidence which included a 
sense that reliance on outsiders – and by implication extraversion - might end. On the other hand, 
the Post-Ebola period saw the collapse of government confidence and the reassertion of donor 
influence, but within a more intensely personalised and centralised modus operandus clearly 
promoted by both president and a shift in thinking of one donor agency. This concentration 
appeared for a while to increase efficiency and then to increase possibilities for both influence and 
extraversion for exactly these two nodes of power, but simultaneously to spread disaffection in 
government and the donor community.  
CONCLUSION 
It can safely be said that, overall, the paradox of donor-government relations in Sierra Leone can 
be explained by relative stability over the long-term and volatility over the short-term. Bookended 
by the post-war years and the Ebola and iron ore crises, a short period of increased government 
confidence can be discerned. The relations at any time during the post-war era are rightly 
described as extraordinary in their closeness and in the depth of donor influence, but this masks a 
topography with considerable undulations.  
Space for donors to push reform is curtailed. There are policies which are less problematic or 
welcomed by parts of government but others which are indeed troublesome to government on 
either democratic, social, or intra-governmental lines related to power, corruption or policy. There 
are areas where the government endeavours to pursue its own policies or resist those of the 
donors. For the latter, the government sometimes can resist but at other times for structural 
reasons in the end it cannot. Disaggregating, one can see President Koroma and certain 
ministries/ministers being more generally receptive and other ministries/ministers - such as the 
MoE and MoHS during this time period - being more resistant. Much is decided at a personal 
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level, demonstrated in particular by the key position of the President and some of the political 
battles between him and ministers. 
The Ebola and post-Ebola period shift towards centralisation - or perhaps going even further with 
the grain - led to a rather skewed system where there were a number of losers within the 
government side, in particular in the ministries and departments. Donor-donor coordination also 
suffered in this centralisation and was not in the best of health in 2016. This might in other times 
have offered a degree of muscle to the government but Ebola and the loss in revenues on the one 
hand and a President looking at a Post-Ebola Recovery legacy saw off many sources of potential 
GoSL influence over donors.  
So, who is in the driving seat? The answer lies in the particular and depends on the complex 
interplay of interests, ideas, structure and agency. It is indeed remarkable, given the superficial 
appearance of stability and apparent dependency on and overbearing influence of donors, that all 
these forces play a part. Equally, extraversion has its explanatory limits. It is plausible when 
considering those areas of acquiescence, resistance and obfuscation which affect elements in 
government, such as donor projects which financially benefit or deprive supporters or offer 
avenues for elite accumulation. It is also plausible in the clear limits to donor influence. However, 
there are times and instances when donor influence is indeed exerted via the structurally 
imbalanced conditions. Extraversion is also much less convincing in trying to explain resistance to 
donor reforms on lines of societal mores; or when looking at government policy which is not in 
line with donor priorities, although government can of course turn to other outside sources for 
some of these needs. In addition, it clearly shifts over time in its explanatory importance and is 
significantly affected by changing structural conditions, whereby dependency and extraversion 
fluctuate in their explanatory powers. In concert with other processes there may be unexpected and 
potentially destructive ramifications such as acute centralisation of power. Importantly, the belief 
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held for a short period of time by some in Sierra Leone that donors would be ‘going home’ does 
not seem to fit at all in extraversion theory. 
In a wider sense, the Sierra Leone case has enough historical and socio-political peculiarities, 
particularly in the perturbations of the 2010-16 period, to make the transferability of the 
conclusions of this article limited. However, in other cases of small African states, there may be 
some comparable elements. For instance, Rwanda and Malawi show interesting comparisons, the 
former as more of a conductor – in the musical sense - of Western agencies and the latter with a 
donor-government relationship as complex as that of Sierra Leone (Hayman 2009; Wroe 2012). 
There is though one other general conclusion which has traction elsewhere. The number of factors 
considered in this article should lead us to think carefully before simplifying the donor-
government terrain either in terms of structure or imperatives or over time. Relations are clearly an 
ongoing work of construction. Given that conclusion, it remains to be said that even a severely 
sceptical view of the effects of Western aid or on the other hand an equally optimistic prognosis 
need both to take into account the details of fluctuating government-donor relations to be aware of 
the full picture.    
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Table 3 Sierra Leone: Recent Economic Developments, 2008–16 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                             2008   2009    2010      2011    2012      2013     2014      2015      2016 
GDP at constant prices  
(% change)                   5.2      3.2         5.3        6.0     15.2       20.1      4.5         -20.5        4.9       
(GDP excluding iron ore)     5.2      3.2         5.3        5.8     5.3         5.5        0.8          3.2           3.7 
 
Current account  
Balance                                -8.9 -6.3  -19.7  -45.0 -39.4  -20.5 -20.1  -16.3  -18.3            
(Including official  
grants) 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: IMF 2013; 2016; 2017. 
 
Table 4 Summary of Direct Budget Support (in millions of USD): 2002-14 
Donor 2002–14 
UK – DFID 284 
EU 248 
World Bank 161 
AfDB 141 
Others (including IMF and Global Fund) 52 
Total  886 
 Source: Adapted from Ecorys 2016 
 
NOTES 
                                                          
1 Broken down: ‘strong’ and ‘positive’ (donors), ‘permissive’ (NGO), ‘influence’ (donors and NGOs), ‘big role’ and 
‘open door’ (GoSL), and ‘appreciation’ (donor). 
2 Limited returns include Sierra Leone’s position of 184 out of 189 ranked countries in the UNDP’s Human 
Development Index. 
3 This correlates with donor interviewees relating a ‘hardening’ in the GoSL stance in July 2011.  
